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Lesson 28: How Does the First Amendment Affect the Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion?
Lesson Purpose
The exact meaning of the establishment and free exercise clauses has been a topic of fierce debate. Did the Founders intend to build "a wall of separation between Church and State" as Thomas Jefferson asserted? Or did they merely intend to prevent religious persecution and the establishment of one national religion?
When you have finished this lesson, you should be able to explain the importance of religious freedom in the United States and to identify primary differences between the establishment and free exercise clauses. You should be able to describe how the Supreme Court has interpreted the religion clauses, ongoing issues involving those clauses, and how conflicts can arise between the establishment and free exercise clauses. Finally, you should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on issues arising from guarantees relating to the establishment and free exercise of religion clauses of the Constitution.
Lesson Objectives
- explain the importance of religious freedom in the United States and to identify primary differences between the establishment and free exercise clauses,
- describe how the Supreme Court has interpreted the religion clauses, ongoing issues involving those clauses, and how conflicts can arise between the establishment and free exercise clauses, and
- evaluate, take, and defend positions on issues arising from guarantees relating to the establishment and free exercise of religion clauses of the Constitution.
Lesson Terms
Lesson Court Cases
Case Summary
George Reynolds, secretary to Mormon Church leader Brigham Young, challenged the federal anti-bigamy statute. Reynolds was convicted in a Utah territorial district court. His conviction was affirmed by the Utah territorial supreme court.
Question(s)
Does the federal anti-bigamy statute violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause because plural marriage is part of religious practice?
Answer(s)
No. Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, writing for a unanimous court, held that the statute can punish criminal activity without regard to religious belief. The First Amendment protected religious belief, but it did not protect religious practices that were judged to be criminal such as bigamy. Those who practice polygamy could no more be exempt from the law than those who may wish to practice human sacrifice as part of their religious belief.
See: The Oyez Project, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)
Case Summary
A Massachusetts law allowed cities to require residents to be vaccinated against smallpox. Cambridge adopted such an ordinance, with some exceptions. Jacobson refused to comply with the requirement and was fined five dollars.
Question(s)
Did the mandatory vaccination law violate Jacobson's Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty?
Answer(s)
No. The Court held that the law was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power to protect the public health and safety of its citizens. Local boards of health determined when mandatory vaccinations were needed, thus making the requirement neither unreasonable nor arbitrarily imposed.
See: The Oyez Project, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
Case Summary
Jesse Cantwell and his son were Jehovah's Witnesses proselytizing in a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. The Cantwells distributed religious materials by traveling door-to-door and by approaching people on the street. After voluntarily hearing an anti-Roman Catholic message on the Cantwells' portable phonograph, two pedestrians reacted angrily. The Cantwells were subsequently arrested for violating a local ordinance requiring a permit for solicitation and for inciting a breach of the peace.
Question(s)
Did the solicitation statute or the "breach of the peace" ordinance violate the Cantwells' First Amendment free speech or free exercise rights?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while general regulations on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive to many, did not entail any threat of "bodily harm" and was protected religious speech.
Case Summary
Lillian and William Gobitis were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the flag as part of a daily school exercise. The Gobitis children were Jehovah's Witnesses; they believed that such a gesture of respect for the flag was forbidden by Biblical commands.
Question(s)
Did the mandatory flag salute infringe upon liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Answer(s)
No. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court declined to make itself "the school board for the country" and upheld the mandatory flag salute. The Court held that the state's interest in "national cohesion" was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values" and that national unity was "the basis of national security." The flag, the Court found, was an important symbol of national unity and could be a part of legislative initiatives designed "to promote in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the institutions of their country." This decision was overturned in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943).
See: The Oyez Project, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)
Case Summary
The West Virginia Board of Education required that the flag salute be part of the program of activities in all public schools. All teachers and pupils were required to honor the flag; refusal to salute was treated as "insubordination" and was punishable by expulsion and charges of delinquency.
Question(s)
Did the compulsory flag salute for public schoolchildren violate the First Amendment?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and held that compelling public schoolchildren to salute the flag was unconstitutional. The Court found that such a salute was a form of utterance and was a means of communicating ideas. "Compulsory unification of opinion," the Court held, was doomed to failure and was antithetical to First Amendment values. Writing for the majority, Justice Jackson argued that "if there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
See: The Oyez Project, West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
Case Summary
A New Jersey law allowed reimbursements of money to parents who sent their children to school on buses operated by the public transportation system. Children who attended Catholic schools also qualified for this transportation subsidy.
Question(s)
Did the New Jersey statute violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment?
Answer(s)
No. A divided Court held that the law did not violate the Constitution. After detailing the history and importance of the Establishment Clause, Justice Black argued that services like bussing and police and fire protection for parochial schools are ""separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function"" that for the state to provide them would not violate the First Amendment. The law did not pay money to parochial schools, nor did it support them directly in any way. It was simply a law enacted as a ""general program"" to assist parents of all religions with getting their children to school.
See: The Oyez Project, Everson v. Board of Education 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
Case Summary
In McCollum v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court disallowed an Illinois program in which representatives of religious groups came to public schools and taught classes during the school day. In the aftermath of that decision, New York City began a program in which students in public schools could be dismissed from classroom activities for certain periods to participate in religious instruction elsewhere. That program was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals.
Question(s)
Did the New York program violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Answer(s)
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "released time" program neither constituted the establishment of religion nor interfered with the free exercise of religion. The Court noted that public facilities were not being used for the purpose of religious instruction and that "no student was forced to go to the religious classroom." Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas argued that there was "no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence."
See: The Oyez Project, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
Case Summary
Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons and was prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law.
Question(s)
Did the Pennsylvania blue law violate the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religious beliefs?
Answer(s)
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Pennsylvania blue law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute; however, the freedom to act (even in accordance with religious convictions) is not totally free from government restrictions. The Court found that the Sunday Closing Law had a secular basis and did not make any religious practices unlawful. The blue law is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the state can accomplish its secular goal of providing a uniform day of rest for all through other means. That an indirect burden, such as economic sacrifice, may be a result of the statute, does not make the blue law unconstitutional.
See: The Oyez Project, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
Case Summary
The Board of Regents for the State of New York authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. This was an attempt to defuse the politically potent issue by taking it out of the hands of local communities. The blandest of invocations read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and beg Thy blessings upon us, our teachers, and our country."
Question(s)
Does the reading of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day violate the "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment?
Answer(s)
Yes. Neither the prayer's nondenominational character nor its voluntary character saves it from unconstitutionality. By providing the prayer, New York officially approved religion. This was the first in a series of cases in which the Court used the establishment clause to eliminate religious activities of all sorts, which had traditionally been a part of public ceremonies.
Case Summary
The Abington case concerns Bible-reading in Pennsylvania public schools. At the beginning of the school day, students who attended public schools in the state of Pennsylvania were required to read at least ten verses from the Bible. After completing these readings, school authorities required all Abington Township students to recite the Lord's Prayer. Students could be excluded from these exercises by a written note from their parents to the school. In a related case--Murray v. Curlett--a Baltimore statute required Bible-reading or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at open exercises in public schools. Murray and his mother, professed atheists, challenged the prayer requirement.
Question(s)
Did the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school students to participate in classroom religious exercises, violate the religious freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Answer(s)
Yes. The required activities encroached on both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause of the First Amendment since the readings and recitations were essentially religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so." Furthermore, argued Justice Clark, the ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies by a written note was irrelevant since it did not prevent the school's actions from violating the Establishment Clause.
See: The Oyez Project, Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
Case Summary
On March 27, 1964, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for military service. Welsh requested and filed an application for conscientious objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection was not rooted in religious belief; he responded "No" where the questionnaire asked if he believed in a supreme being. An appeal board rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled in United States v. Seeger (1965) that conscientious objector status was not reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit court of appeals found that because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as "religious," Welsh's conviction was valid.
Question(s)
Can Welsh claim conscientious objector status even though he professes no religious-based objection?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a 5-3 plurality opinion authored by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court declared a registrant's characterization of his beliefs as nonreligious to be "a highly unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption." According to Justice Black, the term "religious" is broadly scoped, and denying conscientious objector status because of a refusal to use the term "places undue emphasis on the registrant's interpretation of his own beliefs." The Court therefore reasoned that conscientious objector status applies to "all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."
Case Summary
This case was heard concurrently with two others, Earley v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The cases involved controversies over laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute provided financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct supplemental salary payments to teachers in non-public elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to "church-related educational institutions."
Question(s)
Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the First Amendment's establishment clause by making state financial aid available to "church-related educational institutions"?
Answer(s)
Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger articulated a three-part test for laws dealing with religious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must have principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court found that the subsidization of parochial schools furthered a process of religious inculcation, and that the "continuing state surveillance" necessary to enforce the specific provisions of the laws would inevitably entangle the state in religious affairs. The Court also noted the presence of an unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning legislation which appropriates support to religious schools.
See: The Oyez Project, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
Case Summary
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs.
Question(s)
Did Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16 violate the First Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their children to school for religious reasons?
Answer(s)
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment outweighed the state's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade. In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values and programs of secondary school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion," and that an additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education cited by Wisconsin to justify the law. Justice William O. Douglas filed a partial dissent but joined with the majority regarding Yoder.
See: The Oyez Project, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
Case Summary
Sydell Stone and a number of other parents challenged a Kentucky state law that required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in each public school classroom. They filed a claim against James Graham, the superintendent of public schools in Kentucky.
Question(s)
Did the Kentucky statute violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court ruled that the Kentucky law violated the first part of the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, and thus violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted "had no secular legislative purpose" and was "plainly religious in nature," and noted that the Commandments did not confine themselves to arguably secular matters (such as murder, stealing, etc.), but rather concerned matters such as the worship of God and the observance of the sabbath.
Case Summary
Eddie C. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness and an employee of Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co., asked his company to lay him off when it transferred all of its operations to weapons manufacturing. He stated that his religious faith prohibited him from producing arms. His employer refused, so he quit instead. He applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act, which the Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division denied. The board agreed that he quit because of his religious convictions, but claimed that this was not a "good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work" that would qualify him for benefits. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that it burdened Thomas' First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana reinstated the board's initial decision, calling Thomas' decision to quit a "personal philosophical choice" that only indirectly burdened his free exercise right.
Question(s)
Does the Free Exercise Clause require a state to provide unemployment compensation benefits to an employee who quit because of a belief that his religion prohibited him from engaging in the employer's line of work?
Answer(s)
Yes. In an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Burger, the Court held that the Review Board's denial of unemployment benefits to Thomas violated his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court of Indiana wrongfully used Thomas' struggle to "articulate" his religious beliefs as grounds to call his decision merely "philosophical." The Court's decisions in Everson v. Board of Education and Sherbert v. Verner had established that "[a] person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public program." In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the free exercise clause did not require a "State to provide direct financial assistance to persons solely on the basis of their religious beliefs."
Case Summary
A Minnesota law allowed taxpayers to deduct from their state income tax expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children's elementary or secondary school education. Parents who sent their children to parochial school also qualified for the deductions.
Question(s)
Did the law violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Answer(s)
No. The Court held that the law did not have "the primary effect of advancing the sectarian aims of the non-public schools," nor did it "excessively entangle" the state in religion. Most importantly, argued Justice Rehnquist, the deductions were available to all parents; in effect, Minnesota did not "confer any imprimatur of state approval" on religious schools. Thus, the law passed the Court's three-pronged test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) used to evaluate claims regarding the Establishment Clause.
See: The Oyez Project, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
Case Summary
Bob Jones University was dedicated to "fundamentalist Christian beliefs" which included prohibitions against interracial dating and marriage. Such behavior would lead to expulsion. In 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changed its formal policy to adopt a district court decision that prohibited the IRS from giving tax-exempt status to private schools engaging in racial discrimination. The IRS believed that the university's policies amounted to racism and revoked its tax-exempt status. The university claimed that the IRS had abridged its religious liberty. This case was decided together with Goldsboro Christian Schools Inc. v. United States, in which Goldsboro maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible, accepting, for the most part, only white students. The IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an exempt organization and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes. After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit claiming that the denial of its tax-exempt status violated the U.S. Constitution.
Question(s)
Can the government prohibit race discrimination at the expense of the First Amendment's free exercise clause?
Answer(s)
The Court found that the IRS was correct in its decision to revoke the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University and the Goldsboro Christian School. These institutions did not meet the requirement by providing "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life" to be supported by taxpayers with a special tax status. The schools could not meet this requirement due to their discriminatory policies. The Court declared that racial discrimination in education violated a "fundamental national public policy." The government may justify a limitation on religious liberties by showing it is necessary to accomplish an "overriding governmental interest." Prohibiting racial discrimination was such a governmental interest. Hence, the Court found that "not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional."
See: Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
Case Summary
The city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, annually erected a Christmas display located in the city's shopping district. The display included such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," and a nativity scene. The nativity scene had been included in the display for over 40 years. Daniel Donnelly objected to the display and took action against Dennis Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket.
Question(s)
Did the inclusion of a nativity scene in the city's display violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Answer(s)
No. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that notwithstanding the religious significance of the nativity scene, the city had not violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the display, viewed in the context of the holiday season, was not a purposeful or surreptitious effort to advocate a particular religious message. The Court found that the display merely depicted the historical origins of the holiday and had "legitimate secular purposes." The Court held that the symbols posed no danger of establishing a state church and that it was "far too late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the [Establishment] Clause on the country."
See: The Oyez Project, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)
Case Summary
An Alabama law authorized teachers to set aside one minute for voluntary prayer or meditation in school classrooms during the school day. Three of Jaffree's children attended public schools in Mobile.
Question(s)
Did Alabama law violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?
Answer(s)
Yes. The Court determined the constitutionality of Alabama's prayer and meditation statute by applying the secular purpose test, which asked if the state's actual purpose was to endorse or disapprove of religion. The Court held that Alabama's passage of the prayer and meditation statute was not only a deviation from the state's duty to maintain absolute neutrality toward religion, but was an affirmative endorsement of religion. As such, the statute clearly lacked any secular purpose as it sought to establish religion in public schools, thereby violating the First Amendment's establishment clause.
See: The Oyez Project, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
Case Summary
Donald E. Thornton worked as a supervisor in the Caldor department store chain. A devout Presbyterian, Thornton asked to be excused from working Sundays at the company's store in Torrington, Connecticut. The store required its managers to work one of every four Sundays, although rank-and-file employees were exempt under their union contract from Sunday work. In 1979, the company refused to allow Thornton to take off Sundays but offered him a transfer to another store, an hour away in Massachusetts, that was closed on Sundays. When he turned that down, the company said it would demote him from his manager's job and cut his hourly pay from $6.46 to $3.50. Thornton had worked Sundays for nearly eight months before he became aware the store was violating Connecticut law giving employees an absolute right not to work on their chosen sabbath. He filed a grievance against Caldor with the state board of mediation. The board ruled in his favor. The state supreme court reversed. Thornton died in 1982 and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case brought on behalf of his estate.
Question(s)
Does the Connecticut statute violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Answer(s)
Yes. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court held 8-to-1 that the Connecticut sabbath observance statute was void, saying its "unyielding weighing in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests" results in an unconstitutional mingling of church and state. In his opinion, Burger wrote that the Connecticut law "provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on their Sabbath." Burger said the state law "thus commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or those of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath."
Case Summary
Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear could not be worn "except by armed security police in the performance of their duties."
Question(s)
Did the Air Force Regulation violate the free exercise clause of the First Amendment?
Answer(s)
The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the need for the military to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." Since allowing overt religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate. In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and allowed members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a "neat and conservative" manner.
Case Summary
New York City's airport authority banned repetitive solicitation of money within airline terminals but permitted it outside the terminals. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness solicits funds in public places. It challenged the regulation. A federal district court granted an injunction against the airport authority. The authority appealed.
Question(s)
Does the regulation violate the First Amendment free speech clause?
Answer(s)
No. An airport terminal is not a public forum. The regulation banning such activity need only satisfy a reasonableness standard. The regulation is reasonable. Solicitators may slow the path of possible contributors, cause duress or commit fraud. Therefore, the regulation is permissible. In a related case, the Court held invalid the airport authority's ban on literature distribution in airport terminals.
See: International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)
Case Summary
A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour use of school property and facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the statute, prohibited the use of its property by any religious group. The district refused repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for an after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and child rearing. The chapel brought suit against the school district in federal court.
Question(s)
Did the district violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech when it denied Lamb's Chapel the use of school premises to show religious-oriented films?
Answer(s)
Yes, by a unanimous vote. The Supreme Court's holding consisted of two parts. First, the district violated freedom of speech by refusing the chapel's request to show movies on school premises solely because such movies were religiously oriented. While non-public schools are permitted under New York law to restrict access to their premises based on subject matter or speaker identity, such restrictions must be reasonable and "viewpoint neutral." In this case, the district's restriction was neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, since it allowed the presentation of all other views about family values and child rearing--except those which were presented from a religious perspective. Second, a grant of permission to the chapel to use the district's premises would not have amounted to an establishment of religion. This is because the showing of the films would neither be school-sponsored during school hours nor closed to the public.
See: The Oyez Project, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
Case Summary
The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria. Santeria used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death rites, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the city council adopted several ordinances addressing religious sacrifice. The ordinances prohibited possession of animals for sacrifice or slaughter, with specific exemptions for state-licensed activities.
Question(s)
Did the city of Hialeah's ordinance, prohibiting ritual animal sacrifices, violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause?
Answer(s)
Yes. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The ordinances had to be justified by a compelling governmental interest and they had to be narrowly tailored to that interest. The core failure of the ordinances were that they applied exclusively to the church. The ordinances singled out the activities of the Santeria faith and suppressed more religious conduct than was necessary to achieve their stated ends. Only conduct tied to religious belief was burdened. The ordinances targeted religious behavior, therefore they failed to survive the rigors of strict scrutiny.
See: The Oyez Project, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
Case Summary
Ronald W. Rosenberger, a University of Virginia student, asked the University for $5,800 from a student activities fund to subsidize the publishing costs of Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The University refused to provide funding for the publication solely because it "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality," as prohibited by university guidelines.
Question(s)
Did the University of Virginia violate the First Amendment rights of its Christian magazine staff by denying them the same funding resources that it made available to secular student-run magazines?
Answer(s)
Yes. The Court, in a 5-to-4 opinion, held that the University's denial of funding to Rosenberger, due to the content of his message, imposed a financial burden on his speech and amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court noted that no matter how scarce University publication funding may be, if it chooses to promote speech at all, it must promote all forms of it equally. Furthermore, because it promoted past publications regardless of their religious content, the Court found the University's publication policy to be neutral toward religion and, therefore, not in violation of the establishment clause. The Court concluded by stating that the University could not stop all funding of religious speech while continuing to fund an atheistic perspective. The exclusion of several views is as offensive to free speech as the exclusion of only one. The University must provide a financial subsidy to a student religious publication on the same basis as other student publications.
See: The Oyez Project, Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
Case Summary
The Archbishop of San Antonio sued local zoning authorities for violating his rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), by denying him a permit to expand his church in Boerne, Texas. Boerne's zoning authorities argued that the archbishop's church was located in a historic preservation district governed by an ordinance forbidding new construction, and that the RFRA was unconstitutional insofar as it sought to override this local preservation ordinance. On appeal from the Fifth Circuit's reversal of a district court's finding against Archbishop Flores, the Court agreed to hear Boerne's case.
Question(s)
Did Congress exceed its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers by enacting the RFRA which, in part, subjected local ordinances to federal regulation?
Answer(s)
Yes. Under the RFRA, the government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. The Court held that while Congress may enact such legislation as the RFRA, in an attempt to prevent the abuse of religious freedoms, it may not determine the manner in which states enforce the substance of its legislative restrictions. This, the Court added, is precisely what the RFRA does by overly restricting the states' freedom to enforce its spirit in a manner which they deem most appropriate. With respect to this case, specifically, there was no evidence to suggest that Boerne's historic preservation ordinance favored one religion over another, or that it was based on animus or hostility for free religious exercise.
Case Summary
Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 provides for the allocation of funds for educational materials and equipment, including library materials and computer software and hardware, to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement "secular, neutral, and nonideological" programs. In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, about 30% of Chapter 2 funds are allocated for private schools, most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated. Mary Helms and other public school parents file suit alleging that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, violated the First Amendment's establishment clause. The district court initially agreed, finding that Chapter 2 had the primary effect of advancing religion because the materials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were direct aid and that the schools were pervasively sectarian. However, after the presiding judge who made the initial ruling retired, the case was reviewed by a new judge, who reversed that decision. Thereafter, based on different precedent, the court upheld Chapter 2. In reversing, the court of appeals held Chapter 2 unconstitutional.
Question(s)
Does Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Answer(s)
No. In a 6-3 plurality decision delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that that Chapter 2, as applied in Jefferson Parish, is not a law respecting an establishment of religion simply because many of the private schools receiving Chapter 2 aid in the parish are religiously affiliated. Turning to neutrality to distinguish between indoctrination attributable to the state and that which is not, Justice Thomas wrote for the Court, "[i]f the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the government."
Case Summary
Prior to 1995, a student elected as Santa Fe High School's student council chaplain delivered a prayer, described as overtly Christian, over the public address system before each home varsity football game. One Mormon and one Catholic family filed suit challenging this practice and others under the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The district court barred the public Santa Fe Independent School District (the District) from implementing its policy as it stood. While the suit was pending, the District adopted a new policy, which permitted, but did not require, student-initiated and student-led prayer at all the home games and which authorized two student elections, the first to determine whether "invocations" should be delivered at games, and the second to select the spokesperson to deliver them. After the students authorized such prayers and selected a spokesperson, the district court entered an order modifying the policy to permit only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer. The court of appeals held that, even as modified by the district court, the football prayer policy was invalid. The District petitioned the Supreme Court, claiming its policy did not violate the Establishment Clause because the football game messages were private student speech, not public speech.
Question(s)
Does the Santa Fe Independent School District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment?
Answer(s)
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the District's policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded that the football game prayers were public speech authorized by a government policy and taking place on government property at government-sponsored school-related events and that the District's policy involved both perceived and actual government endorsement of the delivery of prayer at important school events. Such speech is not properly characterized as "private," wrote Justice Stevens for the majority. In dissent, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, noted the "disturbing" tone of the Court's opinion that "bristle[d] with hostility to all things religious in public life."
See: The Oyez Project, Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
Case Summary
Under New York law, Milford Central School policy authorizes district residents to use its building after school for certain activities. Stephen and Darleen Fournier were district residents eligible to use the school's facilities. They sought approval of their proposed use and sponsorship of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children. The Fourniers submitted a request to hold the club's weekly after-school meetings at the school. Milford denied the request reasoning that the proposed use, including singing songs, hearing Bible lessons, memorizing scripture, and praying, was the equivalent of religious worship prohibited by the community use policy. The club filed suit alleging that the denial violated its free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ultimately, the district court granted Milford summary judgment. In affirming, the court of appeals held that because the club's subject matter was "quintessentially religious", and the activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character development,'" Milford's policy of excluding the club's meetings comprised subject discrimination, which is protected, not viewpoint discrimination, which is not.
Question(s)
Did Milford Central School violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the Good News Club when it excluded the club from meeting after hours at the school? If a violation occurred, was it justified by Milford's concern that permitting the club's activities would violate the Establishment Clause?
Answer(s)
Yes. No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held that "Milford's restriction violates the Club's free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justifies that violation." "When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment," wrote Justice Thomas.
See: The Oyez Project, Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001)
Case Summary
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued three Kentucky counties in federal district court for displaying framed copies of the Ten Commandments in courthouses and public schools. The ACLU argued the displays violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the displays violated the establishment clause.
Question(s)
1. Do Ten Commandments displays in public schools and in courthouses violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?" 2. Was a determination that the displays' purpose had been to advance religion sufficient for the displays' invalidation?
Answer(s)
Yes. Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice David Souter, the majority held that the displays violated the establishment clause because their purpose had been to advance religion. In the case of each of the displays, the Court held, an observer would have concluded that the government was endorsing religion. The first display for presenting the Ten Commandments in isolation; the second for showing the Commandments along with other religious passages; the third for presenting the Commandments in a presentation of the "Foundations of American Law," an exhibit in which the county reached "for any way to keep a religious document on the walls of courthouses."
Case Summary
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (2000, RLUIPA) prohibited government from imposing a substantial burden on prisoners' religious exercise, unless the burden furthered a "compelling government interest." Prisoners in Ohio alleged in federal district court that prison officials violated RLUIPA by failing to accomodate the inmates' exercise of their "nonmainstream" religions. The prison officials argued that the act improperly advanced religion and thus violated the First Amendment's establishment clause (which prohibited government from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion"). The district court rejected that argument and ruled for the inmates. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
Question(s)
Did a federal law prohibiting government from burdening prisoners' religious exercise violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?
Answer(s)
No. In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that, on its face, RLUIPA made an accommodation allowed by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that the law was an effort to alleviate the "government-created burden" on religious exercise that prisoners faced. Nor did section three discriminate between mainstream and non-mainstream religions. The Court did point out that constitutional problems could arise if RLUIPA were enforced improperly and religious prisoners received favored treatment, or if religious exercise and security concerns were not properly balanced.
See: The Oyez Project, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)
Case Summary
Thomas Van Orden sued Texas in federal district court, arguing a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the state capitol building building represented an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion. Orden argued this violated the First Amendment's establishment clause, which prohibits the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion." The district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Orden and said the monument served a valid secular purpose and would not appear to a reasonable observer to represent a government endorsement of religion.
Question(s)
Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause, which barred the government from passing laws "respecting an establishment of religion?"
Answer(s)
No. In 5-4 decision, and in a four-justice opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Court held that the establishment clause did not bar the monument on the grounds of Texas' state capitol building. The plurality deemed the Texas monument part of the nation's tradition of recognizing the Ten Commandments' historical meaning. Though the Commandments are religious, the plurality argued, "simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the establishment clause."
Lesson Primary Sources
The Bill of Rights as it was submitted to the states for ratification. It included a preamble and ten proposed amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
The Maryland Toleration Act, passed by the assembly of the Maryland colony, mandated tolerance for Christians who did not practice Anglican Christianity, as the colony was founded in hopes of creating a refuge for Catholics in the New World. The act marks the earliest legal provision for freedom of religion and against hate speech, though it did make blasphemy punishable by death and was repealed in 1692.
James Madison's response to a bill introduced in the Virginia general assembly which would levy a tax to support religious instructors. The bill was tabled and, instead, the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, authored by Thomas Jefferson, passed a few months after Madison had drafted what is now an often-cited argument for the separation of church and state.
From Wikipedia: From Wikipedia: The first Act of Supremacy granted King Henry VIII of England Royal Supremacy which is still the legal authority of the Sovereign of the United Kingdom. Royal Supremacy is specifically used to describe the legal sovereignty of the civil laws over religious ones, which validated Henry VIII's marriage to Anne Boleyn over the papal refusal to annul his previous marriage to Catherine of Aragon. Though it was an act of Parliament, the wording of the act stated it as recognized fact, rather than implying that Parliament was granting the king the title.
From Wikipedia: In the United States, the Bill of Rights is the name by which the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution are known. They were introduced by James Madison to the First United States Congress in 1789 as a series of articles, and came into effect on December 15, 1791, when they had been ratified by three quarters of the states. It responded largely to Anti-Federalists who believed that ratifying the U.S. Constitution meant surrendering basic human rights of individuals.
The supreme law of the United States that provides the framework for the government. The Constitution outlines the nation's institutions of government and the most important rights of the people. The document was created in 1787 during the Philadelphia Convention. The government created by the Constitution took effect on March 4, 1789.
From Wikipedia: The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom was written in 1779 by Thomas Jefferson. The law prohibited the state government from forcing a person to support of any kind of religious practice, and prohibited the abuse of individuals because of their beliefs. In 1786, the Virginia General Assembly enacted the statute into the state's law.
The famous speech on the separation of church and state given by John F. Kennedy in 1960 while campaigning in Texas for president. Kennedy was the first and only Roman Catholic president and his religious affiliation caused controversy among Protestants who believed he might take orders from the Pope.
